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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
JOSE ORLANDO VALDOVINOS : Case No. 20020410-CA 
Defendant/Appellant : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for three counts of aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-302 
(1999). On November 5, 2002, the Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to this 
Court. R. 113. This Court has jurisdiction over criminal appeals which the Utah 
Supreme Court transfers to it. Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. In deciding whether to impose probation, sentencing judges must consider the 
defendant's character, the seriousness of the crime, the defendant's prior record, the 
likelihood of rehabilitation, and whether probation will best serve the public interest. 
The trial judge denied probation even though Appellant, Jose Orlando Valdovinos, had a 
minor prior record, no history of violence, low IQ, and special rehabilitative needs. Did 
the trial judge abuse her discretion in denying Mr. Valdovinos the benefit of probation? 
Trial judges have broad discretion in determining whether to grant probation. 
State v. Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Trial counsel requested the 
sentencing judge to impose a one-year jail term followed by probation. R. 120: 5-6.l 
2. The trial court abuses its discretion if it imposes consecutive sentences without 
considering all relevant sentencing factors including the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. In imposing 
consecutive sentences below, the sentencing judge failed to consider Mr. Valdovinos' 
lack of criminal record, poor intelligence, youth, supportive family, follower mentality, 
and need for rehabilitation. Did the sentencing judge abuse his discretion in imposing 
consecutive sentences? 
This Court reviews sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Montova. 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Appellant requested concurrent 
sentences at sentencing. R. 119: 6-7. 
Volume 120 contains the sentencing hearing transcript. Volume 119 contains the 
hearing during which the trial judge ordered the Department of Adult Parole and 
Probation to diagnostically evaluate Mr. Valdovinos. Volume 118 contains the guilty 
plea hearing. The internal page numbers of those volumes are included after "R.:" and 
the volume number. 
The envelope marked number 127 contains the presentence report ("PSR"). The 
envelope marked 128 contains a Diagnostic Evaluation Report ("DE Report"), 
Psychological Evaluation ("Psych. Evaluation"), and a Diagnostic Group Report ("Group 
Report"). The internal page numbers of these documents will be listed after a description 
of each individual document within the envelopes. 
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RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-401(4) (1999) provides: 
A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of 
the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive 
sentences. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Mr. Valdovinos in three separate cases in juvenile court with 45 
counts of various crimes involving three separate incidents. R. 2, 14. The crimes 
included aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated kidnaping. R. 2, 14; 
127: 2-3. After Mr. Valdovinos waived his right to a preliminary hearing, the juvenile 
court bound him over to the district court as an adult for trial. R. 14. 
On September 24, 2001, Mr. Valdovinos entered a plea agreement in which he 
agreed to plead guilty to three counts of aggravated robbery with weapons and group 
enhancements in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining counts. R. 55. The 
prosecutor reserved the right to recommend concurrent or consecutive sentences. R. 55. 
The trial court accepted Mr. Valdovinos' plea the same day. R. 118: 14. 
On December 20, 2001, Mr. Valdovinos filed a motion to set aside his guilty plea 
because the State offered a co-defendant a similar plea bargain that did not include the 
enhancements. R. 71. After initially opposing the motion, the prosecutor agreed to drop 
the enhancements. R. 83; 119: 5. 
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The trial judge conducted a sentencing hearing on January 28, 2002. R. 119. 
Rather than sentencing Mr. Valdovinos, the trial judge ordered the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole ("APP") to conduct a 60-day evaluation of Mr. Valdovinos. R. 119: 
9-10. Following the evaluation, the trial judge sentenced Mr. Valdovinos on April 1, 
2002, to three consecutive terms of five years to life. R. 120: 18; Addendum. Mr. 
Valdovinos filed a notice of appeal on April 30, 2002, R. 103. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During April and May of 2001, Mr. Valdovinos and several other young men 
entered three homes in Salt Lake City and robbed the occupants. PSR: 3-8. Mr. 
Valdovinos was 17 at the time of these crimes. PSR: 1-6. He turned 18 years old on May 
23, 2001, eight days after the final incident. PSR: 1, 3. 
During each of the home invasions, four males either knocked on the front door of 
the home and/or forced their way inside with guns and subdued the residents. PSR 4-8. 
After securing the homes, the assailants ordered the adult occupants to lie face down on 
the floor. PSR: 4-5. The intruders used speaker wires, electrical cords and neckties to 
bind the victims' hands behind their backs. PSR: 4-7. The assailants rummaged through 
the homes in search of valuables such as jewelry, cash, credit cards, and video and 
electronic equipment. PSR: 4-7. The robbers also pointed guns at the heads of the 
victims and demanded money. PSR 4-7. 
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In one case, the assailants herded several females and children to the basement 
where the assailants threatened to take the children if the females did not cooperate. PSR: 
5. In another case, the leader of the group, surnamed Pille, kicked an adult male and 
demanded money and drugs as the victim laid on the floor with his hands bound behind 
his back. PSR: 7. Mr. Pille then stabbed this victim causing a wound that later required 
four stitches to close. PSR: 7. The assailants also threatened to kill the victims if they 
contacted the police. PSR: 5, 7. 
Mr. Valdovinos' role apparently was to stand guard over the victims. PSR: 7. 
During the second robbery, Mr. Valdovinos became concerned when one of the victims 
was experiencing heart problems. PSR: 7. Then, in the last robbery, when a female 
victim suffered an asthma attack, Mr. Valdovinos allowed another female to go upstairs 
to retrieve an inhaler to relieve the stricken woman's asthma symptoms. PSR: 4-5. 
Following the robberies, the police interrogated Mr. Valdovinos. PSR: 4. 
Although Mr. Valdovinos initially denied any involvement in the crimes, he later 
admitted his participation. PSR: 4. He stated that he was a member of gang called 
California Latin King. PSR: 5. The assailants chose the three homes because they 
believed the occupants were selling drugs. PSR: 4. According to the police, Mr. 
Valdovinos stated that "the police department should thank him for hitting the homes of 
drug dealers." PSR: 4. Mr. Valdovinos refused to reveal the identities of his 
accomplices. PSR: 4, 6. 
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On May 31, 2001, the State charged Mr. Valdovinos, in three separate cases in 
juvenile court, with 45 felonies relating to the home invasions. R. 76; PSR: 1-3. Mr. 
Valdovinos waived his right to a preliminary hearing and the juvenile court bound him 
over as an adult to the district court. R. 14. 
On September 24, 2001, Mr. Valdovinos signed a written plea agreement in which 
he agreed to plead guilty to three counts of aggravated robbery with enhancements for the 
use of a weapon and for committing the crimes as a group. R. 55. In exchange, the 
prosecutor agreed to dismiss the remaining counts and also reserved the right to argue for 
consecutive sentences. R. 55. Later that same day, the trial court conducted a guilty plea 
hearing and accepted Mr. Valdovinos' guilty pleas. R. 118: 14. Although the agreement 
originally included weapons and group enhancements, the prosecutor later agreed to drop 
the enhancements. R. 119: 5. 
Prior to sentencing, the trial judge ordered APP to prepare a presentence 
investigation report. R. 118: 16. The report revealed that Mr. Valdovinos'father was 
incarcerated when Mr. Valdovinos was a child and that his mother had to work to support 
the family. PSR: 15. As a result, Mr. Valdovinos was often left to care for himself. PSR: 
15. Mr. Valdovinos' mother later remarried Mr. Valdovinos' stepfather who appears to 
have emotionally and financially supported the family. PSR: 15. 
Mr. Valdovinos performed poorly in school because of a learning disability. PSR: 
15, 18. School records listed Mr. Valdovinos' IQ as 73 and he read on a second grade 
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level. R. 24; PSR 18. Accordingly, he dropped out of school before completing the 10th 
grade. PSR: 15. 
About the time Mr. Valdovinos left school, he joined the Latin King gang. PSR: 
15. His only previous juvenile offenses consisted of a school trespass and a curfew 
violation. PSR: 13. He has never been placed on probation for any criminal behavior. 
PSR: 14. 
Mr. Valdovinos admitted his involvement in the crimes to the APP investigator. 
PSR 8. He explained that Mr. Pille suggested robbing several drug houses and he 
willingly went along. PSR: 8. Mr. Valdovinos expressed his remorse for the crimes and 
stated, "I feel bad. I don't want to go to prison." PSR: 8, 17. In the event the trial judge 
granted Mr. Valdovinos probation, Mr. Valdovinos' family invited him to return to the 
family home. PSR: 18. Mr. Valdovinos described his goals as successfully completing 
probation, finding employment, attending night classes to get his high diploma, and 
studying computers. PSR: 17-18. 
In assessing Mr. Valdovinos' risk level, the APP investigator concluded that Mr. 
Valdovinos posed a moderate risk. PSR: 18. The investigator viewed as 
"condescending" Mr. Valdovinos' claim that he helped the police by robbing drug 
dealers. PSR: 19. APP also noted that the numerous victims had suffered significant 
emotional distress because of the crimes. PSR: 19. The investigator further believed that 
Mr. Valdovinos remained entrenched in gang culture as exhibited by his unwillingness to 
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assist police in investigating the crimes. PSR: 19. 
Contrary to APP's subjective assessment, an objective criminal history scale 
indicated that intermediate sanctions were appropriate. PSR: Form 1. In listing the 
aggravating and mitigating factors, APP noted that Mr. Valdovinos posed a serious threat, 
his crimes were extremely cruel or depraved, multiple victims were involved, and his 
attitude was not conducive to less restrictive settings. PSR: Form 4. Despite Mr. 
Valdovinos' youth, supportive family, and seemingly lesser role in the crimes, APP listed 
no mitigating circumstances. PSR: Form 4. 
The trial judge held a sentencing hearing on January 28, 2002. R. 119. Defense 
counsel requested the trial judge to delay sentencing and to order APP to conduct a 60-
day evaluation at prison. R. 119: 6-7. The judge stated that she had reviewed the PSR 
and was prepared to sentence Mr. Valdovinos. R. 119: 4, 9. Nevertheless, she ordered 
the 60-day evaluation after learning that the prosecutor's agreement to drop the 
sentencing enhancements no longer required mandatory minimum sentences and, instead, 
granted her discretion whether to even impose a prison term. R. 119: 8-9. 
The diagnostic evaluation confirmed that Mr. Valdovinos' IQ was borderline 
mentally retarded. He scored 66 and 67 on two different IQ tests. DE Report at 2; Psych. 
Evaluation at 4. Mr. Valdovinos read on a third grade level, spelled on a second grade 
level, and had math skills at a fifth grade level. DE Report at 2; Psych. Evaluation at 4. 
Mr. Valdovinos had difficulty understanding some of the tests presented him because of 
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"specific intellectual deficits" that he had. Psych. Evaluation at 5. The evaluators also 
attributed Mr. Valdovinos' poor performance to his failure to complete assignments and 
his claims that he did not understand English or the assignments well enough. DE Report 
at 2, 4; Group Report at 2. 
The evaluation indicated several thinking errors including taking pride in crime, 
seeking power over others, lacking empathy for the victims, and viewing situations and 
people as for or against him. DE Report at 3; Group Report at 1-2. Although Mr. 
Valdovinos avoided interaction in group settings several errors revealed themselves. In 
particular, Mr. Valdovinos expressed feeling excitement from the crimes and stated that 
he participated in the robberies for money. DE Report at 2. He was also more concerned 
about his image among his peers than he cared for the victims' well-being. DE Report at 
2. Finally, Mr. Valdovinos continued to associate with fellow gang members while he 
was imprisoned for the evaluation. DE Report at 2-3. Based on these thinking errors, the 
evaluators concluded that Mr. Valdovinos presented a "significant risk" of re-offending. 
DE Report at 3, 5. 
Because Mr. Valdovinos' "abstract reasoning skills are not very good" and he 
avoids self-analysis, the evaluators concluded that he was not a good candidate for 
probation, psychotherapy, or other treatment programs. DE Report at 5; Group Report at 
2; Psych. Evaluation at 4. In fact, two group homes had rejected Mr. Valdovinos' request 
for admission. DE Report at 4. The evaluators recommended that Mr. Valdovinos be 
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imprisoned or, in the alternative, serve at least one year in jail. DE Report at 5; Group 
Report at 2; Psych. Evaluation at 6. 
The trial judge convened a second sentencing hearing on April 1, 2002. R. 120. 
Defense counsel requested the trial judge to impose a one-year jail term followed by 
intensive supervised probation or, at the very least, concurrent sentences. R. 120: 5-7. 
The prosecutor requested prison terms and consecutive sentencing. R. 120: 11. Mr. 
Valdovinos expressed remorse for his actions and requested an opportunity for probation, 
stating, "I want to change. I'm changing. I want another chance. I can serve another 
year. I regret what I did. I wanted to ask forgiveness to the Court for what I did." R. 
120: 14. 
The trial judge stated that she had spent an inordinate amount of time reviewing 
the sentencing factors in this case. R. 120: 14-15, 17. The judge then sentenced Mr. 
Valdovinos to prison on each count for five years to life and ordered the terms to run 
consecutively. R. 120: 18. As justification for her decision, the trial judge cited the 
"egregious, violent nature" of the crimes. R. 120: 15. She specifically noted that small 
children watched their parents being tied up and robbed. R. 120: 15. Although the trial 
judge was aware of Mr. Valdovinos' low IQ and potential to be manipulated by others, 
she concluded that his family had taught him to obey the law but he had knowingly 
rejected their teachings. R. 120: 15-16. As possible mitigation, the trial judge conceded 
that Mr. Valdovinos helped one victim obtain medication. R. 120: 15. But, she reasoned 
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that the plea negotiations had already favored Mr. Valdovinos, including the dismissal of 
numerous counts and the dropping of the sentencing enhancements. R. 120: 16, 18. 
Concerning the possibility of probation and treatment, the trial judge found that 
Mr. Valdovinos was either cognitively incapable of learning or that he was unwilling to 
change. R. 120: 16-17. In support, she noted that Mr. Valdovinos continued to associate 
with gang members during the diagnostic evaluation. R. 120: 16-17. Because of his gang 
associations, the trial judge concluded that Mr. Valdovinos remained a threat to the public 
and was not a candidate for probation or treatment. R. 120: 16-17. 
The trial judge then reasoned that consecutive sentences were appropriate because 
this case involved three distinct crimes with multiple victims. R. 120: 17. She was also 
concerned about Mr. Valdovinos' justification that he was targeting drug dealers' homes. 
R. 120: 17. Even excusing this "perception," the trial judge faulted the assailants for 
mistaking the victims for drug dealers on each occurrence. R. 120: 17. According to the 
trial judge, she intended to impose the "harshest sentence" possible. R. 120: 18. Mr. 
Valdovinos now appeals the trial judge's sentencing decision. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial judge rejected Mr. Valdovinos' request for probation without considering 
relevant mitigating evidence and without concern for his rehabilitative needs. Although 
the trial judge was aware of the mitigating evidence and Mr. Valdovinos' low 
11 
intelligence, she focused primarily on the seriousness of the offenses in denying 
probation. The trial judge had a duty not just to uncover mitigating evidence but also to 
weigh that evidence and fashion a sentencing accordingly. Here, the judge failed to 
adequately weigh Mr. Valdovinos' youth, supportive family, lesser culpability in the 
crimes, and concern for the victims. Additionally, the judge failed to credit Mr. 
Valdovinos' inconsequential prior criminal history. Of most concern, the trial judge 
neglected to address Mr. Valdovinos' mental and educational needs. Instead, she appears 
to have erroneously viewed Mr. Valdovinos' poor mental functioning as an aggravating 
circumstance. Even APP and the diagnostic evaluators recognized that intermediate 
sanctions such as probation may be appropriate. Finally, the 15-year minimum sentence 
deprives the Board of Pardons and Parole of discretion to suit a sentence to Mr. 
Valdovinos' unique needs. 
Similarly, the trial judge failed to consider these mitigating circumstances in 
imposing consecutive sentences. In a remarkably similar fact situation, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider the defendant's 
youth and minimal criminal record in imposing consecutive sentences. This appeal 
presents an even stronger case for concurrent sentencing given Mr. Valdovinos' youth, 
susceptibility to follow others, non-violent history, and need for cognitive restructuring. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO GIVE ADEQUATE WEIGHT TO THE 
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES INCLUDING MR. 
VALDOVINOS' YOUTH, MINIMAL CRIMINAL 
HISTORY, LESSER CULPABILITY, AND 
REHABILITATIVE NEEDS 
In denying Mr. Valdovinos the opportunity for probation and in imposing 
consecutive sentences, the trial judge abused her discretion in failing to consider relevant 
mitigating circumstances. This case involved Mr. Valdovinos' first felony convictions. 
He has a minor criminal record and has never been afforded the opportunity for 
probation. Moreover, APP, the diagnostic evaluators, and the trial judge all failed to give 
adequate weight to Mr. Valdovinos' poor intellectual functioning, concern for his victims, 
and follower mentality. Rather, they faulted Mr. Valdovinos for his low intelligence 
instead of considering his rehabilitative needs. The trial judge's focus on the seriousness 
of the crimes overshadowed the relevant mitigating circumstances that supported 
probation, or at the very least, concurrent sentencing. 
A. By Focusing on the Seriousness of the Offense 
and Dismissing Mr. Valdovinos' Rehabilitative 
Needs, the Trial Judge Failed to Adequately 
Weigh the Mitigating Evidence Supporting 
Probation 
The trial judge failed to consider relevant mitigating evidence and neglected to 
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appreciate Mr. Valdovinos' needs in denying him probation. Given Mr. Valdovinos' 
youth, minimal criminal history, lesser culpability, concern for the victims, and poor 
intellectual functioning, probation was a legitimate sentencing option. Despite the 
evidence supporting probation, the trial judge focused on the seriousness of the offenses 
and flatly ruled out a jail term and probation. Probation was a legitimate sentencing 
option when properly weighing these mitigating circumstances. 
The trial judge abused her discretion in failing to consider a jail sentence and 
probation. Sentencing judges have wide discretion in deciding whether to order probation 
in lieu of a prison term. State v. Chapoose, 1999 UT 83, ^ [6, 985 P.2d 915, 917. Judges 
have power to "impose sentence or a combination of sentences which may include the 
payment of a fine, restitution, probation, or imprisonment." State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 
417, 420 (Utah 1987) (footnote omitted); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (Supp. 
2002). "An appellate court will set aside a sentence imposed by the trial court if the 
sentence represents an abuse of discretion, State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 
1978), if the trial judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors, State v. Holland, 777 
P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989), or if the sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed by law." 
State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989). 
In exercising their discretion to impose probation, judges must consider several 
factors. These factors include the "'character, personality and attitude'" of the defendant. 
State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting State v. Sibert, 310 
14 
P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957)). Judges must also weigh the seriousness of the crime, the 
defendant's prior record, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. IdL at 1049, 1051. In sum, 
sentencing judges must consider whether probation "will best serve the ends of justice 
and is compatible with the public interest." IdL at 1051. 
Here, the trial judge abused her discretion in failing to adequately weigh the 
circumstances supporting a jail term and probation. State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 
1235 (Utah 1990); Gibbons, 779 P.2d at 1135. APP's failure to accurately assess Mr. 
Valdo vinos' circumstances directly resulted in this abuse of discretion. APP's subjective 
recommendation for a prison term overlooked its own criteria for determining the 
appropriate sentence. Although APP was quick to highlight the aggravating 
circumstances surrounding the offenses, it neglected to consider obvious mitigating 
circumstances included on its own form. PSR: Form 4. 
For example, despite the fact that Mr. Valdovinos had not even turned 18 at the 
time of these offenses, APP failed to list Mr. Valdovinos' youth as a mitigating 
circumstance. PSR: Form 4. This omission is identical to the sentencing decision in 
State v. Strunk 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993). There, the trial judge was aware that the 
defendant was 16 years old at the time he kidnaped, sexually assaulted, and murdered a 
six-year old girl, but the judge failed to consider this factor in determining the mandatory 
minimum sentence. Id at 1298, 1300. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that "being 
aware of [the defendant's] age and taking it into account are not the same thing." Id at 
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1300. 
The trial judge below similarly omitted Mr. Valdovinos' age in determining her 
sentencing calculus. At the time of the crimes, Mr. Valdovinos was 17 years old and 
appeared to be easily influenced by others to engage in criminal conduct. Nevertheless, 
the trial judge focused mainly on the seriousness of the offenses in imposing consecutive 
prison terms. Further, a remand appears to be even more appropriate in this case because 
the murder, kidnaping and sexual assault of a child in Strunk were as or more serious 
than the robberies here. 846 P.2datl301. 
APP further failed to acknowledge Mr. Valdovinos' supportive family as a 
mitigating factor. PSR Form 4. Not only had Mr. Valdovinos' family taught him well 
but they offered to give him a place to live to get him started should he be granted 
probation. The offer of a place to live certainly increased Mr. Valdovinos' chances for 
success on probation. 
APP also failed to appreciate Mr. Valdovinos' lesser role in the crimes. PSR: 
Form 4. Admittedly, Mr. Valdovinos participated in three serious criminal episodes in 
which numerous people (some in the presence of children) were threatened with guns, 
bound, and robbed inside their own homes. But, Mr. Valdovinos does not appear to be as 
hardened as APP portrayed. Rather, he was a follower rather than a leader of the group 
whose job was to stand guard. Additionally, when one victim suffered an asthma attack, 
Mr. Valdovinos allowed another victim to retrieve medication to alleviate the problem. 
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He also expressed concern for another victim who was experiencing heart problems. 
Although the trial court noted that Mr. Valdovinos assisted one victim in obtaining 
medication, she placed little value on this act. R. 120: 12. To the contrary, the relative 
culpability of a defendant compared to his or her co-defendants is a relevant factor in 
sentencing. United States v. Simpson, 8 F.3d 546, 549 (7th 1993); State v. Smith, 864 
P.2d 709, 717 (Kan. 1993). Mr. Valdovinos deserved some credit for his concern for the 
victims and his lesser role in the crimes. 
Even accepting APP's conclusions, APP's own objective criteria for determining 
sentencing recommendations concluded that only intermediate sanctions were 
appropriate. PSR: Form 1. The PSR revealed that Mr. Valdovinos had a minor criminal 
history consisting solely of a school trespass and a curfew violation. PSR: 13. These 
small offenses involved no violence and resulted in fines and suspended sentences. 
Further, Mr. Valdovinos had never been placed on probation for prior criminal activity. 
Thus, even APP's own assessment of Mr. Valdovinos' background supported imposing a 
lesser form of punishment that an extended prison sentence. 
Mr. Valdovinos' poor intellectual functioning further supported probation. The 
record established that Mr. Valdovinos' IQ was below 70 which is widely accepted as the 
cut-off for determining mental retardation. Atkins v. Virginia. 122 S.Ct. 2245 nn. 3, 5 
(2002). Mr. Valdovinos' low intelligence level is further consistent with the conclusion 
that he was a follower rather than a leader. The United States Supreme Court recently 
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stated as much: 
Because of their impairments, [] by definition [mentally 
retarded persons] have diminished capacities to understand and 
process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes 
and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to 
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. 
There is no evidence that they are more likely to engage in 
criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence that 
they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated 
plan, and that in group settings they are followers rather than 
leaders. 
Id. at 2250. The trial judge's sentencing decision fails to adequately consider these 
limitations. 
Although the trial judge recognized Mr. Valdovinos' poor cognitive skills and 
susceptibility to manipulation by others, she failed to address his needs. Instead, she 
zeroed in on Mr. Valdovinos' "egregious" conduct and then doomed Mr. Valdovinos to 
extended incarceration where he has no obligation to seek any treatment, at all, in prison. 
R. 120: 15; see State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244 (Utah 1995). A jail sentence and 
supervised probation, on the other hand, would guarantee that Mr. Valdovinos received 
treatment, cognitive restructuring, and the monitoring he needs to redress his low 
intellectual functioning and susceptibility to manipulation. 
If anything, the trial judge's reasoning appears to fault Mr. Valdovinos for lacking 
intelligence. She specifically blamed Mr. Valdovinos for not following his family's 
teachings and pursuing a gang lifestyle. R. 120: 15-16. Her conclusions ignore the fact 
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that Mr. Valdovinos may presently lack the skills and intelligence he needs to conform to 
society's norms and to resist the attraction of a gang. Atkins, 122 S.Ct. at 2250. 
Incarcerating him for 15 years does nothing to address Mr. Valdovinos' mental deficits. 
Instead, the trial judge's sentencing decision focuses on the seriousness of the crimes and 
fails to take into consideration "the public interest" in providing Mr. Valdovinos the 
supervision and skills necessary for rehabilitation. Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051. 
The diagnostic evaluators seemed to similarly fault Mr. Valdovinos. Most of them 
concluded that Mr. Valdovinos' was unwilling or incapable of performing well in a 
treatment program. But, the psychologist who evaluated Mr. Valdovinos concluded that 
"specific intellectual deficits" presently prevent Mr. Valdovinos from benefitting from 
treatment. Psych. Evaluation at 5. If Mr. Valdovinos receives no treatment to improve 
his poor intellectual functioning, he will never be in a position to receive the very 
treatment he needs to adhere to society's norms. Thus, the trial judge's refusal to even 
consider a lengthy jail stay followed by supervised release and treatment creates a double 
bind from which Mr. Valdovinos will never escape. 
The diagnostic evaluators seemed to appreciate this dilemma. Despite their 
conclusion that Mr. Valdovinos was not amenable to treatment and should be imprisoned, 
they suggested an alternative sentence of one year in jail followed by an intensive 
supervised treatment program. DE Report at 5. If, as the State claimed, there was no 
hope for Mr. Valdovinos to benefit from treatment, it is curious why the diagnostic 
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evaluators would give this alternate recommendation. 
This case is similar to State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), where the Utah 
Supreme Court concluded that "'[t]he record clearly reflected that the trial courts failed to 
give "'adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances.'" State v. Helms, 2002 UT 
12,1fl5, 40 P.3d 626 (quoting Galll 967 P.2d at 938). Likewise, the trial judge's focus 
below on the seriousness of the crimes establishes an abuse of discretion. Id, By 
dooming Mr. Valdovinos to extended incarceration, especially when he has never 
received the benefit of probation, the trial judge essentially threw up her hands and 
concluded that Mr. Valdovinos was hopeless. The trial judge's hand-wringing, given Mr. 
Valdovinos's age, family support, lesser culpability, and need for treatment, was an abuse 
of discretion. 
B. The Trial Judge Abused Her Discretion in 
Imposing Consecutive Sentences By 
Overlooking Mr, Valdovinos9 Background and 
Rehabilitative Needs 
Although the trial judge was aware of the factors to consider in deciding whether a 
sentence should run concurrently or consecutively, she did not adequately weigh those 
factors. As detailed above, the mitigating circumstances argued in favor of treatment and 
rehabilitation. By imposing consecutive sentences, the trial judge eliminated any 
reasonable opportunity for Mr. Valdovinos to reform his life. Thus, the tria] judge abused 
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her discretion in imposing consecutive sentences 
In determining whether to impose consecutive rather concurrent sentences, judges 
must weigh "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant " Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1999). "An 
abuse of discretion results when the judge 'fails to consider all legally relevant 
[sentencing] factors!.]'" McCovev, 803 P.2d at 1235 (quoting Gibbons. 779 P.2d at 
1135 (fh. omitted)). Courts must further consider that, under Utah law, concurrent 
sentences are presumed over consecutive ones. GalU, 967 P.2d at 938. 
As explained above, rather than focusing on "all legally relevant factors," the 
sentencing judge primarily considered the seriousness of the offenses. Gibbons, 779 
P.2d at 1135. In doing so, she failed to give "adequate weight" to the mitigating factors. 
Galll 967 P.2d at 938. Although the judge stated that she had carefully reviewed the 
PSR and the diagnostic evaluations, simply being aware of sentencing information is not 
enough. The sentencing judge must actually "tak[e] [the information] into account." 
Strunk 846 P.2d at 1300; see also State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 119 (Utah 1985) 
(although sentencing judge knew of unreliable information, he properly exercised his 
discretion in not weighing it). 
The trial judge failed to do so here. Most importantly, the trial judge abused her 
discretion in failing to consider Mr. Valdovinos' youth together with his minimal 
criminal history and rehabilitative needs. The Utah Supreme Court overruled the trial 
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court for this very reason in Strunk. There, the trial court imposed consecutive 
mandatory minimum sentences of 24 years. Strunk, 864 P.2d at 1301. The trial court 
relied, in part, on a diagnostic evaluation that recommended a lengthy prison sentence 
and concluded that the defendant was an extreme danger to the community. Id The 
Utah Supreme Court ruled that although a lengthy sentence may prove to be appropriate, 
a 24-year minimum prison term deprived the Board of Pardons and Parole the 
"flexibility" it needed to suit the defendant's needs. Id The Court concluded that "the 
trial court abused its discretion in failing to sufficiently consider defendant's 
rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme youth and the absence of prior violent 
crimes." Id at 1301. 
That case is nearly identical to this appeal. Mr. Valdovinos was 17 years old at 
the time of the crimes. He also had no prior history of violence. Likewise, here, a 
diagnostic evaluation concluded that Mr. Valdovinos was a threat to the community and 
that a prison sentence was warranted. The trial judge then relied on this evaluation and 
imposed consecutive minimum sentences of 15 years. 
On the other hand, this case presents a stronger argument for concurrent sentences 
than did Strunk. Although Mr. Valdovinos committed more offenses than the defendant 
in Strunk, the crimes at issue here are less serious and Mr. Valdovinos inflicted no 
injuries. Further, unlike in Strunk, both APP and the diagnostic evaluators indicated that 
intermediate sanctions may be appropriate. In addition, Mr. Valdovinos has a supportive 
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family to encourage him through the rehabilitative process. Rather than depriving the 
Board of Pardons and Parole of flexibility, the Board should be free to "monitor [Mr. 
Valdovinos'] subsequent behavior and possible progress toward rehabilitation while in 
prison and to adjust the maximum sentence[s] accordingly." Smith, 909 P.2d at 244. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Valdovinos requests this Court to remand this matter to the trial court for a 
new sentencing hearing. 
Submitted, this 3 ^ day of February, 2003. 
KENT R. HART t 7 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs* 
JOSE ORLANDO VALDOVINOS, 
Defendant. 
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Defendant 




Date of birth: May 23, 1983 
CAT/CIC 
Tape Number: 2002-28 Tape Count: 90152 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/24/2001 {Guilty Plea} 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendants conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
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SENTENCE TRUST NOTE 
RESTITUTION TO BE DETERMINED BY BOARD OF PARDONS 
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